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‘It’s the same situation as it used to be in Iraq… Everyone is afraid of one another’ 
Iraqi refugee fleeing Syria, 2014
Abstract
This paper examines Syria-Iraq relations in order to explore wider issues of regional politics. It 
presents an overview of the historical stages in relations between the two countries since their 
formation, with the aim of using their changing relations as indicators of changes in both regional 
states and in the regional states system. The paper argues that state formation in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) has followed a bell-shaped curve, first rising, then declining, and alter-
ing, in parallel, the character of the states system. Each stage in Syria-Iraq relations is emblematic 
of the state of the MENA states system at the time. 
Syria and Iraq are near ‘siblings’ with key shared experiences. Firstly, their malformed construction 
under imperialism left behind fragmented ‘artificial’ states with built-in irredentism and power-
ful trans-state identities. Secondly, both states’ formation advanced under Ba’thist authoritarian 
regimes via a combination of party-building, oil and war. Then, they also faced similar challenges 
from US hegemony in the region in the 1990s, albeit responding in quite different ways. Finally, 
beginning in 2003 in Iraq, with the US invasion, and in 2011 in Syria, with the outbreak of the 
Syrian Uprising, both states have suffered deconstruction under various combinations of internal 
revolt and external intervention. Syria and Iraq have again been reduced to weak states suffering 
more intense trans-state conflict, loss of territorial control and challenges to their borders. This, 
allied to the penetration of both by trans-state ideology, has placed Syria and Iraq at the epicentre 
of a widening sectarianism of the whole regional system. 
This paper seeks to understand the state formation trajectories of Syria and Iraq. It builds on the 
foundation laid by several classic studies of Syria-Iraq relations, such as Patrick Seale’s (1965) work 
on the struggle for Syria after early independence, Eberhard Kienle’s Ba’th vs Ba’th (1990), which 
focused on the Pan-Arab period and Malik Mufti’s Sovereign Creations (1996), which updated the 
narrative into the period of relative state consolidation. The paper carries the story forward to the 
current time. 
The paper is organised in the following sections: 1) It first adumbrates an historical sociology lens 
for understanding the topic; 2) historic Syria-Iraq relations are then detailed as indicators of the 
evolution of the states and state system; and 3) Syria-Iraq relations just prior to and during the 
Arab Uprisings are examined, as iconic of the current condition of the states system. 
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An Historical Sociology Approach and the  
Construction of the Syrian and Iraqi States
Historical sociology frames state formation as the product of an interaction of states and states sys-
tems. As Buzan and Weaver, in their Regions and Powers (2005) argue, the kind of state, ‘pre-modern’ 
or ‘modern’, prevalent in a region determines its distinctive dynamics. Yet, the system also shapes its 
state components. In the case of the Middle East, Western imperialism initially created the (flawed) 
states system against which the states have reacted, while continuing also to reproduce it. 
Specifically, imperialism, together with the resistance and collaboration of local actors, ‘made’ a 
conflict prone and unstable states system. First, the Middle East was ‘born’ as an exceptionally 
penetrated (Brown 1984) periphery of the world capitalist system. Its ruling elites, in varying 
degrees, were initially imposed, co-opted or dependent on, and often more responsive to, global 
elites than its own citizenry. Second, arbitrary imperial boundary drawing resulted in incongruence 
between dominant identities and the new states. This built irredentism into the regional order 
and left the new states competing for the loyalties of their populations with powerful sub and su-
pra-state identities. Many states were fragmented by rival sub-state identities; on the other hand, 
since the supra-state Arab and/or Islamic umma was a more compelling imagined community than 
the state itself, the wider Arab world became an arena of competition by rival states over regional 
leadership, largely via discourse wars, forcing all regimes to defend their legitimacy by being seen 
to act on behalf of an Arab or Islamic interest (Barnett 1998). Third, the Middle East states system 
made for an intense insecurity of its state components: it was ‘born fighting’, as Buzan put it, with 
the imposition of an Israeli settler state. Imperial boundary drawing produced a multitude of weak 
states afflicted with boundary disputes, while the juxtaposition of large stronger states and small 
mini-states built in destabilising power imbalances. Thus, from the outset, each state felt threat-
ened both by neighbours and by internal, often-trans-state, opposition networks. 
Yet MENA states were also ‘born’ with the material apparatus of governance over a fixed territo-
ry and, with independence, were accorded formal sovereignty. To be sure, initially, actual state 
sovereignty was weak, both in terms of external independence and internal territorial control. 
However, the ‘original sins’ of a flawed state system, external dependency, domestic opposition 
and inter-state threats, were major incentives for state building. In trying to assert actual sover-
eignty, Arab state builders gravitated toward neo-patrimonial practices that combined time-hon-
oured indigenous state-building formulas, notably Ibn Khaldun’s assabiya (elite solidarity built on 
primordial ties but also a shared nationalist or religious-ideological mission) with imported modern 
bureaucratic machinery, mass party organisation and surveillance technology. On-going struggles 
to capture the state apparatus were waged by groups and classes, with those having the strongest 
assabiya, both primordial and ideological, hence capacity to act together and mobilise numbers, 
tending to prevail. 
In order to consolidate their rule, new elites had to co-opt key insiders, incorporate broader rul-
ing coalitions through political institutions, build bureaucratic apparatuses penetrating territory 
and populations, create legitimating national identities, extract resources and defend their states 
against external threats. However, these state building projects were never more than partly suc-
cessful and had their own costs and vulnerabilities. The initial populist authoritarian formula suf-
fered from dependence on ‘insider’ elite assabiya, which tended to alienate ‘outsiders’, on rents 
for the material resources needed for state building, which were finite; and on nationalism for the 
legitimacy, which tended to embroil states in protracted conflicts. 
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Subsequent measures which were meant to address these flaws, such as the turn to neo-liberalism 
and crony capitalism had, however, their own costs that culminated in the Arab Uprisings. The 
Uprisings initiated a new phase of state deconstruction.
State construction (and deconstruction) took place in interaction with the systemic level. The 
multi-layered system in which MENA states were embedded was a source of both threats and 
resources for regime state-builders: the region was embedded in a global core–periphery hierar-
chy that was a potential source of both resources/protection and threats to states’ security and 
sovereignty; there was also a trans-state arena based on shared identities in which states could 
generate legitimacy and seek regional leadership, but also often faced ideological subversion by 
rivals. Whether these arenas were mainly sources of threats or of opportunities and resources, de-
pended on the relative level of state consolidation, which varied over time and between different states; 
consolidation was, in turn, partly a function of states’ ability to access both material and legitimacy 
resources in these arenas
While the initially meagre resources at the disposal of most state builders sharply limited their 
co-optation capacity, the hydrocarbon rent boom of the seventies, greatly increased their abilities 
to buy loyalty and consolidate regimes. As regimes became stronger, they posed greater threats to 
each other and, as this generated a classic ‘realist’ security dilemma, the inter-state arena in which 
neighbouring states were perceived as threats or allies became more salient for state policy-mak-
ers. In periods when the states were weak, the dominant tendency among many MENA states 
was to bandwagon with a global power to get the material resources needed to cope with internal 
or trans-state threats. In periods of greater state consolidation, stronger, potential regional hege-
mons, for example Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, sought to use trans-
state identities to mobilise the region against the Western global powers. Which strategy regimes 
adopted toward the great powers depended not only on their relative capabilities - whether they 
had barely enough to defend their independence or enough to bid for regional hegemony - but also 
on whether their ruling coalitions had been left behind by imperialism or had came to power in 
rebellions against oligarchies left behind by imperialism.
One can identify several phases in which the features of the states, the state system and inter-state 
relations have varied in systematic ways: 
1. The immediate post-independence years, 1945-56, was a period of weak oligarchic states with 
high levels of penetration by external powers, especially the British hegemon, but also facing 
rising trans-state and domestic opposition; 
2. The 1956-70 period of Pan-Arab revolution was one when most states were being destabilised 
by trans-state identity movements. The exception was Egypt, whose early lead in state forma-
tion, as the first successful populist authoritarian regime in the region, allowed it to establish 
itself as an Arab regional hegemon over much weaker rival states. This enabled Cairo to pro-
mote Pan-Arab norms and roll back the high external penetration of the region; 
3. In the 1970-90 period of state consolidation, states, including Syria and Iraq, were able, largely 
relying on rent extracted from the international system (oil market, super-power patronage), 
to built up their bureaucratic and military capabilities. They therefore became more imper-
meable to trans-state forces but also more threatening to each other in a regional multipolar 
system, that approximated Westphalian ‘realist’ features;
4. The 1990-2010 was a period of weakening states which became, in an era of neo-liberal glo-
balisation and US hegemony, increasingly dependent on the core to contain domestic and 
trans-state opposition; 
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5. The 2010+ period of the Arab Uprisings witnessed a combination of exploding domestic/
trans-state opposition and external war or intervention that deconstructed weakening states 
and turned several major actors in regional politics, notably Syria and Iraq, into arenas of trans-
state identity wars. 
These phases and their impacts on Syria-Iraq relations are summarised in Chart 1 and further 
detailed below.
Chart 1 - Evolution of the MENA Region: States, States System, Inter-State Relations
Over this period, the relative strength of the state evolved in a bell shaped curve, first rising toward 
a peak in the eighties and then declining (Hinnebusch 2014). State strength was also inversely 
related to the power of trans-state movements and core penetration of the region; the stronger 
the state the more autonomy it enjoyed from these forces. This, in turn, shaped variations in the 
features of the inter-state relations: the weaker the state, the more the inter-state power struggles 
were conducted by trans-state legitimacy wars, subversion and co-optation by global powers of re-
gional client elites via material resources or military protection; the more consolidated the states, 
the less vulnerable they were to penetration and the more likely they constitute military threats to 
each other. The latter generated ‘Westphalian’ power balancing via military build up and alliance 
formation. As Wendt (1992) argued, the kind of anarchy prevalent in a states system is ‘what states 
make of it’; but what they can make of it depends on their own relative levels of state formation.
Age of Arab Uprisings
2010 - Present
Age of US Hegemony
1990 - 2010
Age of Revolution
1956 - 1970
Age of Realism
1970 - 1990
Age of Oligachy
1945 - 1956
Imperialism
1918 - 1945
�  Consolidated states
�  Declining permeability
�  Westphalian inter-state
balancing
�  Weakening states
�  Core penetration
�  Regional dependency
�  State deconstruction
�  Empowered trans-state 
movements
�  Imposed flawed states 
system
�  Identity incongruence
�  Legitimacy deficits
�  Insecurity
�  Weak permeable states
�  Strong trans-state
identity movements
�  High core penetration 
of region
�  Uneven state formation: 
Egyptian hegemony over 
weak states
�  Strong trans-state identity 
movements
�  Core penetration of region 
rolled back
The Evolution of the States System  
and Syria-Iraq relations
Origin of the States System
The arbitrary imposition of the regional states system at its post-WWI founding, built flaws into 
its fabric, notably the fragmentation of the region into a multitude of weak states which suffered 
from contested borders and identities. In Iraq and Syria these vulnerabilities were exaggerated. 
The arbitrary border between the two cut across tribes and severed trade links, notably between 
Aleppo and Mosul, and parts of what became eastern Syria could just as well have been assigned 
to Iraq. Persisting trans-state interdependencies – e.g. Euphrates river water, oil pipelines, and 
shared identity groups that crossed borders (Kurds, Sunni tribes) – were both opportunities for 
cooperation and vulnerabilities usable against each other. Iraq’s borders, from which Kuwait was 
detached, limited its access to the Gulf, its economic lifeline, and Syria lost its ports on the Med-
iterranean. Both states, being arbitrarily created by imperialism, struggled to acquire the loyalty of 
their populations; while Syria was arbitrarily truncated, with the separation of Palestine, Lebanon 
and Jordan, Iraq was artificially cobbled together, combining three communally different regions 
which shared no history of statehood or common identity: the Sunni Arab centre around Baghdad; 
a majority Shi’a south; and the Kurdish north in a state of chronic insurgency (Dodge 2003). Syr-
ia’s intense feeling of irredentism and insecurity led it to seek integration into a large Pan-Arab 
entity; the solution to Iraq’s identity fragmentation, as promoted by its state builders, was also 
Arab nationalism. It was no accident that it was in these two states, with their intense irredentist 
grievances, that the radical nationalist Ba’th party won power. Chart 2 summarises how the impe-
rial founding of the MENA states system shaped inter-state relations.
Chart 2 - Founding of the MENA States System (1918-1945)
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  Irredentism built into the regional system (dissatisfaction with borders, Pan-Arabism).
�  Permeable states: supra-state and sub-state identities used by rival states to penetrate 
each other.
�  Arbitrary borders cut across trade links (e.g. between Aleppo and Mosul, Euphrates river 
water, oil pipelines) and identity groups such as Sunni tribes and Kurds.
�  Trans-state interdependencies both create shared interests and vulnerabilities to each other.
�  Arbitrary imperial boundary-drawing (Syria arbitrarily divided; Iraq cobbled together) → 
�  Identity fragmentation + identification with states contested by stronger sub-state and 
supra-state identities → state elites lack legitimacy from congruence of ‘nation’ and ‘state’.
�  Client elites imposed or co-opted by imperial powers.
�  Economic dependencies on ‘core’ created.
Weak States under Oligarchic Rule (1945-55)
In the first decade after independence, most Arab regimes were weak landed, tribal and merchant 
oligarchies, whether republican or monarchic, ineffectively incorporating the rising middle-class 
and discontented peasantry, and suffering competition from sub-state and supra-state identities. 
The main external security threats were the stronger non-Arab states, Israel, Turkey and Iran, 
but for the weak Arab regimes, the most immediate threat was from domestic opposition, often 
encouraged by rival states. The region remained intensely penetrated by the ex-imperial powers, 
with ruling elites frequently seen to be Western clients vulnerable to de-legitimation as Arab 
nationalism gathered momentum. Iraq was particularly vulnerable to de-legitimation as the Arab 
lynchpin of British efforts to create a regional security system that would maintain Western inter-
ests and influence in the post-independence period. 
During this period, Iraq was the materially stronger state, owing to its somewhat more cohesive 
institutions, greater material resources (oil) and larger army, while Syria became the focus of a 
regional tug of war over international alignments in the emerging Cold War. Iraq was able to pen-
etrate Syria via politicians, especially through those in the Aleppo-based People’s Party whose 
business and family connections crossed the border. Pro and anti-Iraqi military officers carried out 
repeated coups, notably those of Colonels Husni al-Za’im, Sami al-Hinnawi and Adib al-Shishakli, 
in the early 1950s, destabilising the country. Indicative of the region’s irredentist impulse were the 
efforts of Hashemite Jordan to absorb Syria into a ‘Greater Syria’ that would re-unite its fragment-
ed parts under King Abdullah I of Jordan and the attempt of Iraq to incorporate Syria, through its 
‘Fertile Crescent’ scheme, into a wider union under Baghdad. Syrian regimes aligned with Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia to balance against this Hashemite threat (Maddy-Weitzmann 1993). Chart 3 
summarises the features of the period.
Chart 3 - Age of Oligarchy: Early Independence (1945-55)
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  Weak Arab states lack capabilities to threaten each other except via subversion.
�  Main threat is internal.
�  Dependence on British hegemon.
�  Struggle for Syria between Iraq + Jordan vs Egypt + Saudi Arabia. 
�  Iraq penetrates Syrian politics, using pre-existing trans-state ties to politicians and military 
officers.
�  Oligarchic states dominated by landed/tribal/merchant oligarchs, with weak institutions 
destabilised by politicisation of the military.
�  Main vulnerability: thinly based regimes, seen as Western-dependent, lacking popular 
legitimacy.
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The Era of Pan-Arab Revolution (1956-75)
The mid-fifties to mid-seventies was a period of revolution in which middle-class military officers 
and radical parties challenged, and in many places deposed, the oligarchic regimes. This unleashed 
an era of ‘praetorian’ instability in which fragile state institutions were now contested by rival mil-
itary cliques and failed to absorb politically newly mobilising strata. In Syria, governments rapidly 
succeeded each other, beginning with the left-leaning coalition of the late 1950s, followed by the 
union with Egypt (1958-61), the ‘Separatist Regime’ (1961-63) and the unstable Ba’th regimes of 
1963-66 and 1966-70, with almost all overturned by military coups. In Iraq, the post-revolutionary 
regimes of Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Arif brothers were buffeted by street riots, insurgencies 
and coups by officer cliques aligned with warring political forces, for example Iraqi Ba’thists, Nas-
serists and others. In both states, parliaments were too weak or unrepresentative and the army and 
political parties too fragmented to support strong governments. The exception was Egypt, where 
charismatic leadership under Gamal Abdel Nasser and corporatist institutions stabilised a strong 
regime and allowed the country to bid for regional hegemony. 
An Arab Cold war between Egypt and its rivals, particularly but not exclusively the surviving mon-
archies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, was conducted largely via discourse wars and subversion, with 
most still-unconsolidated states highly vulnerable to such trans-state interference. Egypt’s rivals 
alternated between appeasing Nasser and seeking Western help to balance against him (Kerr 
1971). Among the republics, inter-state competition in this period took the form of ‘competitive 
unionism’, with either a stronger state (Egypt, Iraq) using Pan-Arabism to try to bring weaker 
ones into its sphere of influence, or a weaker state (Syria) using it to defend itself or get support 
from a stronger state (Mufti 1996). Arab nationalist ‘outbidding’, whether over the issue of union, 
anti-imperialism or anti-Zionism, was also typical. 
Dealing with British Imperialism
In the 1950s, the main issue faced by states was how to deal with British imperialism and specifi-
cally, the Baghdad Pact. Created in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain, the Baghdad 
Pact was a security agreement ostensibly aimed at containing the Soviet threat to the Middle East 
but also used by the British as a vehicle to retain their influence in the region. Championed by 
Hashemite Iraq and opposed by Nasser, it unleashed a ‘struggle for Syria’, which was seen as piv-
otal to the outcome (Seale 1965). The battle inside Syria between pro-Iraq and pro-Nasser forces 
swung Syria toward Cairo but also destabilised the country. In this struggle, the rising Syrian left, 
led by the Ba’th party, which amassed influence in parliament, the army and a nationalist coalition 
government, saw Iraq under the Hashemite monarchy and British tutelage as a surrogate for im-
perialism. These emerging differences in the social composition and ideologies of the ruling coali-
tions in the two states pulled them apart in their responses to the West. In 1958, Iraqi subversion 
was a factor in pushing Syria into the United Arab Republic, a protective union with Egypt. This 
move left Baghdad isolated and vulnerable to the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy that year. By 
the 1960s, military coups had initiated revolutions in both states. While the Syrian revolution was 
more ‘from above’, Iraq’s was accompanied by much more intense grassroots mobilisation wherein 
multiple rival identities and ideologies were at odds (Kurdish, Communist, Ba’thist, Nasserite), 
producing a decade of instability. 
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Dealing with Pan-Arabism
In 1963, Ba’thist officers seized power almost simultaneously in Syria and Iraq, resulting in a brief 
episode in which Syrian and Iraqi politicians shared power in trans-state party institutions that 
took decisions on governance in the two states, notably the historic 6th Pan-Arab National Con-
gress in Damascus. This episode was iconic of the relative weakness of state-centric identities, 
compared to trans-state (Arab, Ba’thist) ones. With the Pan-Arab Ba’th in power in both countries, 
the powerful normative expectation was that the unity of the two countries with Egypt would 
follow, thereby creating a powerful Arab nationalist state. Hence, for both Ba’thist Syria and Iraq, 
the main issue throughout the sixties would be how to reconcile their ideological commitment to 
Arab unity with their fear of Nasser’s dominance over a unified state. The two Ba’th parties jointly 
entered negotiations with Nasser for an enlarged United Arab Republic, in which their combined 
weight could balance Nasser’s stature and Egypt’s size. However negotiations failed; Nasser in-
sisted on his pre-eminence but the Ba’thists, after their unhappy experience of the first UAR, did 
not trust him to share power with them. With the failure of a wider unified UAR, Syria and Iraq 
then prepared to unite without Egypt. However, with the ousting of the Ba’thists in Iraq by the 
pro-Nasser officer, Abdul Salam al-Arif, Baghdad entered a lose alignment with Cairo. In Syria 
however, the Ba’thists prevailed over the Nasserites in a prolonged contest in the army and on 
the streets, and were soon on the offensive, using the trans-state Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 
pipeline to pressure Iraq’s weak military regime (Kerr 1971). 
Ba’th versus Ba’th: Wars of Legitimacy
In 1966 the Syrian Ba’th split as rural officers under Salah Jadid, who wanted to make ‘revolution 
in one country’, ousted the older generation of urban and more unionist-oriented founders of the 
party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. In 1968, the Ba’th party again seized power in Iraq 
under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, with Aflaq taking refuge in Baghdad, which 
supported his legitimacy against the radical Ba’thist regime in Damascus. By now, the Iraqi and 
Syrian Ba’ths were bitter rivals for Ba’thist legitimacy. Each had rival Pan-Arab leaderships (Na-
tional Commands) but only one could be legitimate, and hence each attempted to subvert the 
other. Some Sunni Syrian Ba’thists, resentful of the Alawi dominance of the new Syrian regime, 
looked to Baghdad as their patron. In 1969, the Syrian regime again divided over the fall out from 
its 1967 war defeat by Israel. The country split between the radical wing of the Ba’th party and 
the ‘moderates’ under Hafez al-Assad who, in his struggle with his rivals, sought support from Iraq, 
promising to reunite the two party branches. However, when in 1970 al-Assad seized power at the 
expense of the radicals, he reversed his tune. In the seventies, Syria’s Ba’th was able to attract 
elements of the Iraqi Ba’th wary of Saddam Hussein until he finally purged all rivals in 1978. 
The split in the two regimes allowed each to back dissidents in the other in trans-state politi-
cal struggles, indicative of the still modest level of regime consolidation. Legitimacy mattered in 
these struggles because there were, at this point, limited material incentives with which to buy 
loyalty. Unity was, however, impractical because the two regimes’ ruling cores were in-groups 
constructed around personal and sub-state loyalties – Alawis in Syria, Sunni Takritis in Iraq – and 
neither could trust the other enough to share power in unified institutions. This was owing to the 
practices of intra-Ba’th politics, in which factional manoeuvring, often via command of armed units 
or the security apparatus, usually prevailed over institutional rules and those who got the upper 
hand could be expected to purge their rivals (Kienle 1990). The features of the states, state sys-
tem and (Syrian-Iraqi) inter-state relations in this period are summarised in Chart 4.
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Chart 4 - The Age of Revolution (1956-75)
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  Trans-state discourse wars over identity (Arab nationalism).
�  Bi-polarity plus rise of Nasser’s Egypt, spreading revolution →  roll back of British 
hegemony → hegemony of Pan-Arabism.
�  Regional polarisation between revolutionary republics and conservative pro-Western 
monarchies.
�  Dealing with British imperialism: Iraq penetration of Syria in struggle for Syria, Syrian 
alignment with Egypt against Iraq → UAR → Iraqi revolution.
�  Dealining with Nasserism → trans-state struggles over Arab unity.
�  Transnational Ba’thi politics: from trans-state alliance to party split and trans-state 
subversion.
�  Rise of middle-class, politicised military and radical parties, challenging the oligarchy → 
political mobilisation not channelled via institutions → praetorian instability (1950s); 
overthow of oligarchies → unstable military-revolutionary rule (1960s).
�  State formation imbalance: consolidated Nasser’s Egypt, model of populist 
authoritarianism vs weak, penetrated praetorian states.
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War, Oil and Regime Consolidation (1975-90)
A third stage of increased state consolidation in the MENA region was evident from the mid-sev-
enties. The incentive for such consolidation, in the cases of Iraq and Syria, was the weakness of 
similarly fragmented states locked in revolutionary instability, now exacerbated by external threats 
from Israel and Iran. War and war preparation spurred advances in similar army- and party-centred 
defensive state formation. Wars involving Syria and Iraq also precipitated the oil price explosion of 
1973-86 that gave regional states the means to consolidate themselves and expand their military 
capabilities - which, however, only increased the security dilemma for each individual state. 
‘Hard’ Authoritarian State Building under Ba’thism
Against this threatening regional background, the ruling alliances of Ba’th parties and armies in 
the two states devised very similar hard authoritarian regime-building formulas using dual ‘mod-
ern’ and ‘traditional’ strategies (Tripp 1996). ‘Presidential Monarchies’ were consolidated through 
a policy of inserting personal followers, united by primordial assabiya (Alawi in Syria, Takriti in 
Iraq), in the security forces and by the leaders’ balancing between the army, the Ba’th party and 
state-dependent new bourgeoisies. More cohesive ruling cores were now much less vulnerable 
to the factional splintering that had, in the previous period, enabled the two Ba’thist rivals to 
attract partisans in the other’s regime. Leninist style party apparatuses and corporatist structures 
incorporated cross-class and cross-sectarian bases of support, reaching into the villages. 
Armies were now disciplined and professionalised, and reliable chains of command turned them 
from sources of coups into pillars of the regimes. Expanded mukhabarat enjoyed better surveillance 
technology. Enlarged bureaucratic apparatuses penetrated and better controlled the territory of 
the state, which became less permeable and susceptible to trans-state ideological penetration 
(Mufti 1996; Dawisha 1978; Dawisha and Zartman 1988). 
Both regimes achieved autonomy of the dominant classes by ‘socialist’ reforms breaking the oligar-
chies’ control over the economy. Rent from oil or foreign aid, greatly increasing the government 
share of GDP, also gave further regime autonomy of society. This was especially so in Iraq where 
the 1970s nationalisation of the oil industry and oil boom gave the regime massive patronage re-
sources and enabled industrialisation and infrastructural penetration. By contrast, in Syria the ‘so-
cialist’ redistribution of upper-class assets was more important (Mufti 1996: 194, 202-04). In both 
states, education and state employment expanded the state-salaried middle-class, while agrarian 
reform created a state-dependent co-operatised peasantry. Under a populist ‘social contract’, in re-
turn for support or acquiescence, the state provided jobs, free education, subsidised foodstuffs and 
labour rights. The expanding bureaucratic strata’s command of public resources gave them stakes 
in the particular interests of their individual states. New state bourgeoisies positioned at the heart 
of the state and the transformation of part of the surviving private middle-sized business sectors 
into dependent clienteles thriving on state monopolies, commissions, contracts and inputs, turned 
fractions of these upper-middle strata into regime constituents (Perthes 1995: 146-154; Khafaji). 
The regimes’ consolidation drives had foreign policy consequences. Both regimes remained threat-
ened by deep-seated sectarian-ethnic cleavages that they had to address. In these mosaic societies, 
the main alternative to sub-state sectarianism, and the most potentially unifying ideology, was 
Arabism. It was used to consolidate the state, by bringing together Arabic-speaking Sunnis and 
Shi’as (or Shi’a-offshoots such as Alawis). However, its downside was the exclusion of non-Arab 
minorities, above all the Kurds. In both Ba’thist states, ideological legitimacy therefore depended 
on foreign policy being seen to be in the service of Arab nationalism. In Syria, the Assad regime’s 
legitimacy depended on the struggle with Israel. Iraq, increasingly recognised as the strongest 
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Arab power, revived its ambition to be the Prussia of the Arab world, keeping it entangled in the 
Arab-Israel conflict, but also leading to war with Iran (during which common Arab identity kept 
the Iraqi Shi’a from defecting to Shi’a Iran) and to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. 
As state construction matured, the once fragile republics showed an ability to survive intense cri-
ses, including defeat in war. In the early eighties, Syria survived back-to-back Islamic rebellion and 
conflict with an Israeli-American combinazione in Lebanon. Iraq survived the enormous pressures 
of the war with Iran and did not split along communal lines as might have been expected. Sadd-
am Hussein’s regime also survived defeat in the Gulf war (1990-91), the subsequent economic 
blockade and loss of full territorial control. This should not disguise, however, that underlying 
vulnerabilities remained contained, not overcome: the over reliance on in-group assabiya, on rent 
and on militant nationalism.
States were relatively consolidated internally and less vulnerable to trans-state ideology. As all 
states’ power capabilities generally increased as oil rent or foreign aid enabled exceptional arms 
purchases, regional states became greater threats to each other. Locked into intractable conflicts 
on the non-Arab periphery, Iraq and Syria became national security states. Iraq’s regime was con-
solidated in the crucible of the war with Iran, while Syria’s was buttressed by the war with Israel in 
1973 and again in Lebanon in 1982. War drove an upward trajectory in the size of armies, with Syria 
and Iraq achieving exceptional levels of military mobilisation, increasing from 6.4 and 6.7 per 1000 
of the population respectively in 1955 to 36.2 and 62.4 in 1987 (Gause 1992: 457-58). 
Generally, as state consolidation gave ruling elites greater autonomy from society and decreased 
their vulnerability to trans-state ideology, while threats from neighbouring states increased, geopo-
litical reasons of state started taking precedence over Pan-Arab ideology in foreign policy making. 
Syria and Iraq, states that had recently been arenas of regional power struggles among stronger 
states, had now become actors able themselves to affect the regional power balance. Realist power 
balancing, via arms races and alliances, against external threats was increasingly recognisable in 
both states and in the region as a whole. In several cases, the failure of balancing and the upsetting 
of the power balance led to war – which tended, at least partly, to restore the balance – as, nota-
bly, revisionist bids by Israel (1982 invasion of Lebanon) and by Iraq (1979 invasion of Iran) were 
blunted by a counter-balancing Syria-Iran alliance (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997).
Alignment Convergence and Divergence
Syrian-Iraqi relations in the 1970s mirrored the period of transition from the age of Arabism to 
that of state consolidation that the region was undergoing. As Kienle shows, Ba’thist Syria and Iraq 
were natural partners (e.g. against Israel), yet also still rivals for Pan-Arab leadership able to threat-
en each other’s Pan-Arab legitimacy. Hence, they alternated between alignment convergence and 
divergence. Each was sufficiently consolidated to resist the challenges from the other, but each 
continued to play the Arab nationalist card to legitimise themselves in their rivalries. In 1973, the 
conflict with Israel, touchstone of Arabism, brought the two rivals together. Iraqi troops were sent 
to the Syrian front line, but when Syria entered the peace process, Iraq adopted the rejectionist card 
and denounced Syria. Iraq opposed Assad’s 1976 intervention against the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganisation (PLO) in Lebanon in the name of its superior Arabism, mobilising the Iraqi faction of the 
Lebanese Ba’th party against Damascus. The two Ba’ths were again briefly driven into alliance and 
unity negotiations by the threat of an Israel empowered by Egypt’s separate peace. They converged 
at the Baghdad summit of 1978 to get Egypt expelled from the Arab League and to pressure the 
Gulf states into providing subsidies to Syria as the main front-line state in the war with Israel. Each 
Ba’th leadership had to show its constituents that it was serious about unity, but each still felt too 
threatened by the other to actually share power in a combined state (Kienle 1990). 
Yet, as the two states became less penetrable through ideological subversion, their interactions 
took different forms. From the mid-seventies, Syria and Iraq used their trans-state interdepen-
dencies against each other: Syria manipulated the flow of Euphrates water to Iraq and both used 
the trans-Syrian oil pipeline from Iraq against the other, with Syria, the financially weaker party 
trying to extort a share of Iraq’s growing oil wealth through raised pipeline fees. Then, during the 
Iran-Iraq war, realist-like power balancing fully emerged. Syria aligned with Iran against Arab Iraq, 
in seeming violation of the Arab national interest that Ba’thism claimed to embody. Certainly, by 
the 1980s, perceived external threats rather than Pan-Arabism were driving alignments. Thus, 
for Iraq, the main threat was revolutionary Iran, which was trying to exploit sectarian cleavages 
to promote a Shi’a uprising against the Sunni-dominated regime. For Syria, Israel was the main 
threat and Islamic Iran a strategic ally, especially after Tehran fostered Shi’a resistance to the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In revenge, Iraq hosted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which tried 
to mobilise the Sunni majority against the Alawi-dominated Ba’th in the early 1980s, while Syria 
hosted anti-Baghdad Kurdish and Shi’a factions contesting the Sunni-dominated Ba’th in Iraq. 
Iraq later supported the Maronite General Aoun’s opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
While in the seventies the main leverage each regime had over the other was manipulation of Arab 
nationalism in inter-Ba’th politics, by the eighties each exploited the others’ sectarian vulnerabil-
ities and supported non-Ba’th oppositions in the rival state. 
The main consequence of this period was the considerable extent to which the generalisation 
of external insecurity, state consolidation, and reason of state brought the regional system into 
closer approximation to the Westphalian model. This process was crowned by Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait. This injected a much-increased level of military insecurity into inter-Arab politics, in 
which competition had hitherto largely been at the political-ideological level. The features of the 
states, the state system and Syrian-Iraqi inter-state relations in this period, the Age of Realism, are 
summarised in Chart 5.
Chart 5 - Age of Realism (1975-90)
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  States less permeable to trans-state subversion → turn from arenas to actors; elites 
conduct realist foreign policies promoting territorial sovereignty.
�  Militarisation → increased inter-state threats + wars on the Arab-non-Arab frontiers.
�  Inter-state balancing via oil-funded arms races and alliances.
�  Ba’thist Syria and Iraq natural partners against common enemies, yet also threats to 
each other.
�  Inter-party ideological wars and subversion replaced by exploitation of mutual trans-state 
vulnerabilities, support for oppositions. 
�  Alliance formation as power balancing against Israel (after Camp David); against each 
other in Iran-Iraq war.
�  Consolidation of authoritarian neo-patrimonial regimes. 
�  Repressive and co-optative capabilities increased → instability decreases.
�  Vulnerabilities: sectarian solidarity + reliance on rent + costly wars.
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State Vulnerability and US Hegemony (1990-2010) 
Post-Populist Republics 
In a fourth stage, fully apparent by the 1990s, MENA state building projects passed their apex and 
entered a ‘post-populist’ stage which shrank their social bases and legitimacy. The main driver was 
domestic economic weaknesses. Particularly in the MENA’s republics inefficient public sectors, 
the exploitation of economies for military and political ends, and populist distribution policies had 
enervated capital accumulation and led to the exhaustion of statist import substitute industrialisa-
tion. This drove moves to open economies towards private and foreign capital: the so-called infitah. 
Oil rent had financed a burst of state building that resulted, with the oil bust from the mid-1980s 
through the 1990s, in overdeveloped states exceeding the capacity of their own economic bases to 
sustain. Balance of payments crises and debt greatly increased vulnerability to external pressures 
from Western donors and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural adjustment. At 
the same time, a transformation in the social base of the republics was taking place, with the old 
populist coalition being replaced by new infitah (internationalist) coalitions. As the public sector 
was exhausted as a source of wealth and careers, the state bourgeoisie looked to economic liber-
alisation to diversify the state’s economic base and enable it to transform itself into a property 
owning class. The private bourgeoisie saw new opportunities in infitah to acquire foreign partners 
and public sector assets. To elicit private investment, investors had to be favoured over the mass 
public; hence infitah was typically accompanied by a rollback in welfare measures and privatisation 
of public sectors. Attracting foreign investment also meant abandoning the anti-imperialist nation-
alism that had helped legitimise the republics. As regimes reneged on the populist social contract 
on which they had built their legitimacy, those marginalised became available for anti-system 
mobilisation by Islamist counter-elites. While repression and co-optation contained their political 
threat, the gradual Islamisation of society at the grassroots undermined the social bases of secular 
regimes. 
Divergent Responses to the End of Bi-Polarity: The 1990s
Ba’thist Syria and Iraq were more resistant to economic infitah than the other republics: the rem-
nants of socialist ideology coincided with entrenched statist interests, access to oil revenues, sus-
picion of economic penetration by the West, and nationalist refusal to bow to the IMF. In both 
states, milder indigenous versions of infitah were developed, notably with the opening to the pri-
vate sector in late-eighties Syria and privatisations in Iraq. However, the world-shaking systemic 
transformation from bi-polarity toward uni-polarity posed a serious challenge. The greater depen-
dency of their legitimacy on Arab nationalism compared to other Arab states, put Syria and Iraq 
potentially on collision courses with increasing US intrusion into the region. The decline and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union left them without the political protection or military patronage they 
needed to safely pursue foreign policies that challenged Western interests. The loss of an alterna-
tive East bloc market also meant, once buffering oil rent declined, that there was no alternative to 
reintegration into the world capitalist market. Iraq, with its enormous oil resources, was better po-
sitioned than Syria to resist these pressures; but it was perhaps Iraq’s oil and the arms it purchased, 
that led it into ruinous wars that enervated the state. Iraq’s economic vulnerability at the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, exacerbated by the economic warfare waged against it by the Gulf monarchies, 
intersected with Saddam’s ambitions for regional hegemony, to propel Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
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Assad’s alignment against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait showed how far Pan-Arabism had ceased 
to constrain states. As Soviet patronage declined, Assad seized the opportunity to join the Gulf war 
coalition as a way of building credit with the sole remaining superpower, the US, and re-enlisting 
US diplomacy on behalf of a land-for-peace settlement with Israel. This was very unpopular in 
Syria, especially in the eastern tribal regions bordering Iraq, but the regime contained the dissent, 
albeit not without cost to its legitimacy.
Thus, Syrian and Iraqi responses to systemic changes initially diverged: Iraq’s solution to economic 
vulnerability and the end of bi-polarity – the invasion of Kuwait – led to its military defeat and 
sanctions but also continuing defiance of the US hegemon in the 1990s. Syria’s solution was to 
join the anti-Iraq coalition, the 1990s peace process, and to seek integration into world capitalist 
market, hence bandwagoning with the US. This initially generated a sharp divergence in their tan-
gents, largely a function of their different geo-political survival calculations. Had Syria’s engage-
ment in the US-sponsored peace process that followed the Gulf war led to a settlement with Israel, 
the country’s historic Arab nationalist tangent might have been permanently eclipsed. However, 
by 2000 when Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, it had failed, thereby soon restoring Syria’s 
traditional balancing against the US and driving a temporary convergence with Iraq in the early 
2000s. Chart 6 summarises the changes in the states, states system and Syrian-Iraqi inter-state 
relations in this period. 
Chart 6 - The MENA Region under US Hegemony (1990-2010)
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  End of bipolarity → nationalist republics left without patron/protector → uni-polarity 
induces bandwagoning with US hegemon.
�  Iraq’s solution: invasion of Kuwait, bid for Gulf/Pan-Arab hegemony → Iraq under 
sanctions defies the US.
�  Syria’s solution: joins anti-Iraq coalition + 1990s peace process → bandwagons with the 
US in 1990s → until 2000s Iraq war restores balancing against US.
�  Iraq and Syria remain enemies until Bashar al-Assad replaces Hafez → sanction-busting 
oil pipeline deal drives alignment.
�  Syria opposes sanctions and US drive to war in 2003. 
�  Oil prices bust → debt, economic crisis → infitah → restructuring social base of state 
around crony capitalists, foreign investors, exclusion of masses → rise of political Islam 
incorporating marginalised.
�  Post-populist or upgraded authoritarianism → legitimacy deficits.
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Toward State Deconstruction (2003-?) 
The stage of state deconstruction overlaps with that of US hegemony in the region. The US wars 
against Iraq both established its hegemony and initiated Iraq’s deconstruction. Deconstruction in 
the region’s other authoritarian republics, including Syria, was however a result of the Arab Up-
risings. Deconstruction would prove most exaggerated in Iraq and Syria (also Libya) where state 
formation had always been particularly problematic. In Iraq and Syria it was the result of varying 
combinations of external intervention and internal rebellion against these once ‘strong’ regimes, 
with the former more important in Iraq and the latter in Syria. The outcome was the debilita-
tion of central governments’ power and territorial control, a surge of sub/trans-state fragmenting 
identities, and the turning of both states from key actors to battlegrounds of the regional power 
struggle. In each case, regime deconstruction opened the way to interventions by the other; in the 
2000s the Syrian regime intervened in a collapsing Iraq; after 2011, the Iraqi regime intervened in 
a collapsing Syria.  
Iraqi Deconstruction
In Iraq, deconstruction was the combined work of US sanctions throughout the 1990s, the invasion 
of 2003, and sectarian or separatist movements that were in existence well before then. Sanctions 
had greatly weakened the central government, debilitating the middle class, destroying the social 
contract and forcing people to fall back on their communal groups for support. The Saddam regime 
also deliberately fostered tribalism as a substitute for the deteriorating Ba’th party (Baram 1997). 
At the same time, the US sponsored an autonomous regional government in the Kurdish north 
while, in parallel, exiled Shi’a leaders and their followers were positioned in Iran and Syria. 
The US invasion of Iraq empowered these centrifugal social forces by its decapitating of the re-
gime, its dissolution of its pillars, the party, army and bureaucracy, and its debilitation of the central 
government, which lost control of the territory of the state. The US co-opted new Iraqi elites large-
ly along sectarian and regional lines and designed a constitution that distributed posts and resourc-
es along modified consociational/federal lines, institutionalising separate identities at the expense 
of the former Arab identity of the country. In parallel, no strong Iraqi identity emerged to replace 
Arabism and unite the disaggregated parts of the country (Baker 2012; Harling 2012; Rosen 2010). 
The rise of armed resistance to the US, the vacuum that enabled Sunni Islamist radicals to infil-
trate the country, the empowerment and co-optation of the tribes (Sahwa) by the US military, the 
capture of the reconstructed military and security forces by Shi’a militias, the near independence 
of the Kurdish north, the dependence of the new government on the US and Iran, and, with the 
withdrawal of the US, the deep influence of Iran, all spelled the end of Iraq as a cohesive sovereign 
state. Moreover, despite elections, the tendency of Shi’a demographic majorities to translate into 
a permanent Shi’a monopoly of power and the authoritarian power consolidation practices of the 
Nouri al-Maliki government alienated the Kurds and the Sunnis. This led to a resurgence of the 
sectarian conflict that had briefly receded (Dodge 2012; International Crisis Group 2013). 
The fragmented Iraqi state could neither articulate an agreed national interest nor a foreign policy 
position that would make it an effective actor in the regional power struggle. Rather it became, 
with Lebanon, a battleground of inter-Arab politics. External actors sought to penetrate Iraq via 
their local proxies, while Iraqi actors sought to manipulate or draw in on their side external actors 
in a way quite indicative of a weak penetrated state, similar to Lebanon and to Syria before 1963. 
Indeed, Iraq, along with Lebanon, was the main battleground of the 2003-11 regional struggle 
between the rival US/Saudi-led (moderate/Sunni) and Iran-led (resistance/Shi’a) axes. On the 
one hand, the Sunni powers did not accept pro-Iranian Shi’a rule in Baghdad. Over half of heads of 
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states, including GCC rulers, boycotted the Arab Summit meeting in Baghdad in 2012. The Sau-
dis perceived Maliki as an Iranian proxy and backed his rivals among the Sunnis. Indeed, Maliki’s 
coalition included a number of people who held dual Iraqi-Iranian citizenship, while one of the 
main Shi’a actors, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, had been closely linked 
to Iran.   Iraq’s Shi’a political elite, their mindsets still shaped by a persecution complex from the 
period of Saddam, were so threatened by Saudi, and Qatari financing of Sunni Islamist proxies to 
counter Iranian influence, that they were driven further into the Iranian camp. Similarly, Turkey 
also developed intimate ties with Iraqi Sunni politicians and the Iraqi Kurds, pulling them away 
from the influence of Baghdad (Arun and Abeer 2010). 
The formation of the Iraqi government after the 2010 election was a pivotal opportunity for out-
side powers to affect Iraq’s tangent. Turkey had helped in the formation of the trans-sectarian 
Iraqiyya coalition led by Ayad Allawi to contest Maliki’s premiership, while Iran tried to broker a 
Shi’a majority bloc to keep the Sunni-backed Iraqiyya out of power. Ottaway (2011) noted that the 
US and Iran, having both invested in the Maliki regime, de facto contributed to keeping him in 
power even though his party came second in votes to Iraqiyya: Iran persuaded Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
Shi’a movement to back him, while the US convinced Allawi to join a coalition under him. Saudi 
Arabia reputedly tried to block cross-sectarian coalitions of Maliki with, for example, Allawi and 
the Sahwa Uprising tribes. The Kurdish parties were also divided. While the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) was aligned with Turkey, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) supported Iran. 
Insofar as the Iraqi government could act, the rivalry of outside powers gave it some scope to bal-
ance between them. 
Syria and the Iraq War (2003)
In the early 2000s, Iraq was suffering under sanctions and Syria, with the failure of the peace pro-
cess, was in dire need of new resources to sustain its regime. This drove the Assad and Saddam 
regimes to a modus vivendi after decades of rivalry. Their opening of the long closed oil pipelines 
between their countries enabled Saddam Hussein to escape sanctions by exporting oil to Syria, 
which obtained it at a discount, while exporting its own oil at international prices and earning a 
windfall of several billions of dollars. Syrian businessmen also began to enter the Iraqi market. This 
brought Syria into conflict with the US, which was trying to keep Iraq isolated.
Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq. It sought to deny its legitimacy at the UN where it was on 
the Security Council. It also allowed fighters, especially Islamists, to cross into Iraq and join the 
resistance to the US occupation. It aimed to tie down the Americans and discourage the neo-con-
servatives’ ambition to make Syria their next target. Not only did this bring further US animosity, 
but it also dangerously allowed militant trans-state Islamic discourse and jihadi forces in Syria to 
activate. While encouraged to exit to Iraq, this policy revived forces later would boomerang on the 
Syrian regime after the start of the Syrian Uprising. At the same time, Syria’s borders remained 
open to Iraqi refugees fleeing the violence, as well as elements opposing the invasion, especially 
members of the Iraqi Ba’th Party.
In parallel, US pressure, together with Syria’s interest in preventing the spillover effect of an Iraqi 
disintegration on its own similarly multi-communal state, brought Bashar al-Assad to seek a modus 
vivendi with post-invasion Iraqi governments. Syria was particularly wary of the Iraqi Kurds, some 
of whose leadership it hosted before the invasion, including Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, because 
of their alignment with the US and promotion of Kurdish autonomy. Watersheds in the restoration 
of relations with Iraq were the visit of US-appointed Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi in 2004, agree-
ment on a railroad from Mosul to Aleppo and resumption of diplomatic relations in 2006 (Wieland 
2012). Syria also received Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, Iraqi officials, tribal leaders and Shi’a 
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politicians such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim. In 2009, the Syrian and Iraqi prime 
ministers exchanged visits and signed economic and political cooperation agreements. 
Reapproachment was interrupted later that year, when Maliki accused the Syrian-based Iraq Ba’th 
Party of plotting a series of devastating bombings in Baghdad, recalled Iraq’s ambassador and de-
manded that Syria hand over a hundred Iraqi Ba’thists living in Syria, which Syria refused. Before 
and after Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Syria became a venue for bargaining by rival Iraqi 
leaders. The leaders of the Iraqiyya bloc, Tariq al-Hashimi and Ayad Allawi, the main threat to 
Maliki’s hold on power, courted Syrian support and the Iraqi refugee vote. After the vote, Assad 
initially supported Allawi and brokered a meeting with Muqtada al-Sadr to explore a coalition be-
tween the two. The Syrian regime also permitted a public conference of the Younis al-Ahmad wing 
of the Iraq Ba’th party, which supported Allawi and sought reintegration into Iraqi politics (Starr 
2010). With Saudi Arabia also backing Allawi, Syria was now on the Sunni side of a regional power 
struggle usually depicted in mere sectarian terms. Yet, in the end, Assad switched his support to 
Maliki, earning him gratitude, which paid off in the latter’s refusal to isolate him after the start of 
the Syrian Uprising. 
During this period, the struggle over Iraq and Lebanon hardened the two rival regional axes; the 
pro-Western one led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, tacitly including Israel, and the Iran-led one 
including Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their strengths were tested in the Lebanon (2006) and 
Gaza wars (2008-09), in which Israeli military power failed to subdue the latter. The Syrian regime 
under Bashar initially seemed successful in using its nationalist foreign policy to legitimise itself 
within and to successfully balance against US/Western power. This however, proved fleeting.
Syria’s Deconstruction
In Syria, a similar outcome to the state deconstruction in Iraq, albeit owing to a somewhat different 
combination of external and internal forces, unfolded almost a decade later. At Bashar al-Assad’s 
2000 succession, there was considerable optimism that he would initiate political reforms. Howev-
er, his concentration on addressing the economic vulnerabilities of the regime bequeathed to him 
by his father and his preoccupation with warding off threats from the West inadvertently led to 
destabilisation of the regime. The regime’s special vulnerability had always been its dominance by 
Alawi officers in a Sunni-majority society. This was initially overcome by nationalisation and land 
reform, which broke the dominance of the Sunni oligarchy and gave the regime the means to win 
over popular constituencies, especially peasants, via a populist social contract and a nationalist for-
eign policy. However, the exhaustion of the public sector as an engine of development meant the 
regime could only be sustained by rent accessed through foreign policy, at which Hafez al-Assad 
was very adept.
However, such strategic aid declined after 1990, and when Bashar al-Asad came to power, Syrian oil 
revenues were also set to decline. The urgency of economic crisis forced the adoption of neo-liber-
al measures that favoured investors including a shaving of the welfare state and the contraction of 
economic opportunities for the middle and lower classes. At the same time, the regime’s defiance 
of the US in Iraq and Lebanon brought isolation from the West, making the regime dependent on 
Gulf investment. This drove a boom in tourism and real estate in big cities, fuelling growing in-
equality. The regime’s original constituency, a countryside suffering severe drought, was neglect-
ed. Population growth drove the numbers of unemployed youth well beyond the capacity of the 
declining state to absorb. At the same time, in order to establish his authority within the regime, 
Assad purged prominent Sunni politicos and concentrated power in his family clan. He also curbed 
the role of the party and peasant/worker unions, where opposition to his reforms were concentrat-
ed, thereby debilitating the regime’s organised social base. To compensate for this, the regime 
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sought to co-opt crony capitalists profiting from economic liberalisation; it also sought to harness 
moderate Islamic groups to counter both the secular opposition and radical Islamists, inadvertently 
contributing to the spread of grassroots Sunni Islamism; however, it did not take the next step of 
politically incorporating these new constituencies through party pluralisation. 
The opposing sides in the Syrian Uprising reflected the regime’s reconfiguration of its social base. 
It began in the deprived rural towns and suburbs, and then spread to medium sized cities, for 
example Homs, where small manufacturers were victims of trade liberalisation, and Hama, the 
traditional bastion of Sunni notables long resentful of the regime. By contrast to the 1980 Ikhwan 
insurgency when the Sunni village, still incorporated into the regime, sided with the regime against 
the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood, in the 2000s, the debilitation of the party/peasant union in-
frastructure allowed Islamist rebels to mobilise rural support. The regime’s support was comprised 
of crony capitalists, urban government employees and the minorities, although of these, the Kurds 
were split. The main cities, Damascus and Aleppo, where an investment boom, a take-off of tourism 
and the new consumption were concentrated, remained largely quiescent months into the uprising. 
When the Uprising started, the president still retained considerable personal legitimacy as a na-
tionalist and reformer. Had he chosen to respond with major political concessions, Syria’s civil war 
might have been avoided. However, Assad’s security solution, the brutal repression of peaceful 
demonstrators, caused what had been localised protests demanding reform to spiral into a major 
uprising calling for the overthrow of the regime. In parallel, Assad deployed a sectarian discourse, 
denouncing protestors as jihadi terrorists, generating minority solidarity and relying on Alawi mi-
litias to brutalise protestors. Although the protests began with a cross-sectarian discourse, they 
took on an ever more Sunni Islamist cast, partly in reaction to the regime’s sectarian strategy. 
The ulama of the Damascus suburbs and small towns, as well as Muslim Brotherhood connected 
elements, mobilised protestors around Friday prayers, with resistance committees springing up 
around mosques. Regime repression, in time, led to the formation of an armed resistance among 
Sunni army defectors and others who managed to access weapons. Eventually, a massive exit of 
the upper middle and middle classes left a vacuum filled by radical Islamist fighters, many of them 
transnational jihadists.
While the uprising was essentially indigenous, the opposition’s strategy was always to get external 
constraints on regime repression or, that failing, outside intervention. External forces increasingly 
sought to use the uprising to their advantage. Qatar used its Pan-Arab TV channel Al-Jazeera to 
amplify the uprising from the outset, while the Saudis funnelled money and arms to the tribes and 
jihadis who flooded in from across the region to fight the regime. The regime’s only chance of slip-
ping out of this tightening stranglehold lay with its links to Hezbollah to the west and Iran to the 
east. It increasingly relied on Hezbollah, whose fighters helped it stabilise itself and on Iran, which 
supplied financial support, training in counter-insurgency and arms. Iraq, however, was the pivotal 
connection with Iran and its decision to stay out of the anti-Assad coalition was decisive. It acted 
as a transit link from Iran and provided the regime with cheap oil after its oil fields came under 
opposition control. For Sunnis, it was obvious that a defensive Shi’a belt had been constructed to 
turn back a Sunni Islamist revolution.
Thus, Syria became a regional battleground, framed in Sunni-Shi’a terms, quite similar to Iraq. More-
over, a certain ‘Somalisation’ of Syria took place, with the regime controlling Damascus and a corridor 
north to the Alawi areas, the far northeast falling under Kurdish control, and parts of the east under 
tribal control with links to Sunni tribal areas of Iraq. This failed state became a breeding ground of 
trans-state jihadist and salafi Islamic groups, in particular various al-Qaida avatars that spilled over 
from Iraq to fill the power vacuum, most famously, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). 
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The Iraqi Government and the Syrian Uprising
Iraq initially attempted to balance between competing demands on it over Syria, taking a mini-
malist non-partisan stand so as not to inflame the cleavages within its own population. The gov-
ernment of Nuri al-Maliki had only recently accused the Assad regime of involvement in terrorism 
in Iraq, but its fear that the rise of a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus would strengthen 
the already alienated Sunnis in Iraq’s western provinces soon became its overriding consideration. 
In Maliki’s words, ‘I’m not defending the regime. Change must take place. But if Bashar is toppled 
and salafis come to power, Iraq will face a sectarian war’. Iraq abstained from the Arab League 
vote in 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership, rejected the US call for Assad to go, opposed further 
sanctions and the overthrow of the Syrian regime by force and argued that the crisis should be re-
solved by political reforms. While other Arab states downgraded ties with Assad, Iraq moved in the 
opposite direction. It hosted official visits, expanded business ties and provided material support, 
including much needed diesel fuel. Particularly remarkable was Iraq’s willingness to evade US and 
EU demands to cut Iranian arms deliveries to Damascus. Already the US had accused the Maliki 
government of helping Iran circumvent international sanctions. Washington even demanded regu-
lar inspections of Iranian planes crossing Iraqi airspace to intercept arms bound for Syria. Both the 
US and the EU warned that aid was contingent on this cooperation. To ward off these pressures 
and over-dependency that the US could use as leverage over him, Maliki signed a $4.2bn arms 
deal with Russia. Having invested so much in Iraq, the US could not readily cut off aid without 
sacrificing its remaining positions in the country (Ruhayem 2012). However, Iraq kept its lines of 
communication open with some Syrian opposition groups and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari 
rejected claims that Iran was shaping Iraq’s policy toward Syria.
Trans-state Spillover
At the start of the Syrian uprising, observers spoke of a ‘new struggle for Syria’, but meddling by 
outside powers in Iraq via Iraqi proxies became so extensive that one could also speak of a parallel 
struggle for Iraq, with each affecting the other. Indeed, the struggles increasingly merged as Syria’s 
conflict rapidly spilled over into Iraq. This was symptomatic of the trans-state shared identities be-
tween the two states. Public opinion in the western Sunni-majority provinces of Iraq was support-
ive of the Syrian uprising. Fighters and supplies crossed from Anbar province, an arms supply route 
from Saudi Arabia. The Euphrates River Valley intimately connected Syrian and Iraqi tribes, with 
Syrians along the river speaking an Iraqi dialect. During the US-led occupation of Iraq, the tribes 
and mosques of Deir al-Zur had provided significant support to insurgents in Anbar province; now 
Euphrates Valley tribes sent money, weapons and thousands of fighters to support their Syrian 
cousins. With historic familial and financial links to ruling elites in Gulf states, they were conduits 
of the latter’s anti-Assad and anti-Iranian policy. On the other side, Sadrist militias travelled to 
Syria to support the regime. Syrian insurgents attacked Syrian regime forces taking refuge in Iraq, 
even killing Iraqi troops, an explicit episode of violent spillover. There was also a flow of refugees 
to Iraq, some of them Syrian and some Iraqis who had fled civil war in Iraq and were fleeing again 
the similar scenario in Syria (Knights 2012; Wieland 2012:206; Abeer 2012). 
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Chart 7 - The Age of State Deconstruction (2010- )
State Re-making?
The merging Iraqi and Syrian conflicts had potential state re-making implications (Stansfield 
2013). As Barkey (2012) points out, Syria and Iraq are both at the ‘cusp’ of Arab-Kurdish, Per-
sian-Kurdish and Turkish-Kurdish divisions: ‘Before it has run its course [the Syrian uprising] 
could…even alter the region’s post-World War I territorial boundaries’. While only minorities in 
either state wanted a re-drawing of the boundaries of their states, and most retained some iden-
tification with them, armed and proactive minorities took advantage of the debilitation of states’ 
territorial control to advance alternative projects. Syrian activists called for a revolution in Syria and 
Iraq that would ‘quench the fire of Magi [in reference to Shi’as and Alawis] ‘Souria wal Iraq, thawra 
tutfe’ nar el Majows’. In 2014 ISIS seized Mosul and proclaimed a caliphate straddling western Iraq 
and eastern Syria. It rapidly acquired some of the attributes of statehood including heavy weap-
onry, oil resources, control over cities, the ability to enlist wide Sunni disaffection, from tribes to 
ex-Ba’thists and, most remarkably, the defeat it inflicted on the Iraqi army. Ironically, many of the 
supporters of ISIS had been trained and armed by the US in the late 2000s to fight against al-Qaida 
in Iraq, while its forces were heavily armed with US weaponry captured from the Iraqi army. 
State
Formation
States
System
Inter-states
Relations
�  Core Arab republics, such as Iraq and Syria, debilitated; geopolitically stronger non Arab 
powers (Turkey and Iran) and oil-tribal monarchies compete to shape the outcome of state 
de-construction.
�  Borders permeable, conflicts spills across them → Lebanonisation (identity groups seek 
external support in their power struggles e.g. Sunni Arabs look to the Gulf, Shi’a to Iran).
�  Westphalian system (territorial sovereignty) contested → de facto partition, 
de-centralisation, “Somalisation.” 
�  Syrian and Iraqi governments intervene in the power struggle in the other state (to weaken 
or prevent a hostile regime); but switch partners over time, reflective of sectarianisation of 
the conflicts in both states.  
�  Syrian conflict spills into Iraq, symptomatic of trans-state shared identities → sectarian 
alliances cross state boundaries, i.e. Sunni Islamists oppositions vs. Shi’a/Alawi dominated 
governments.
�  Combinations of external intervention and internal rebellion deconstruct key Arab republics.
�  State weakening → debilitation of central governments, cross-sectarian institutions, 
physical infrastructure, service delivery, control over territory, monopoly of violence → 
empowers non-state actors (militias, networks).
�  Identity fragmentation deepens; re-empowerment of sub-state (tribes, sects, ethnic) 
groups and supra-state identities (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaida avatars).
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In Syria, after having been weakened by attacks from more Syria-centric elements of the Islamic 
opposition, including al-Qaida avatar, Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS turned the momentum acquired in Iraq 
to surge back across the border and put its rivals on the defensive. It benefited from a bandwagon-
ing effect, as many disparate groups pledged fealty: ISIS had superior material resources, financial 
and military, provided by Gulf donors or seized from the failing Iraqi and Syrian states. It had a 
powerful religious message, a claim to protect Sunnis, and to provide a modicum of order and wel-
fare where it governed. Many also submitted out of fear of ISIS’s murderous reputation. Indicative 
of the high level of inter-state permeability was the penetration by ISIS fighters as far west as Leb-
anon. ISIS’ vulnerability, however, was that it governed the most tribal areas of Iraq and Syria and 
its fortunes therefore depended on not alienating the tribes as it had done in its earlier incarnation 
in Iraq in the mid-2000s when its extremist conduct gave the US the opportunity to mobilise the 
tribes and Sunni towns against it. Ultimately, however, the Iraqi and Syrian states can only recover 
from the ISIS challenge by much greater inclusion of the disaffected Sunnis, a task that in 2014 
seemed beyond their capability. 
ISIS brought the non-Sunni dominated Iraqi and Syrian regimes further together, manifested, for 
example, in a Syrian air raid on ISIS forces in Iraq which was welcomed by al-Maliki. The ISIS 
threat also increased their dependence on Iran, the power most immediately threatened by radical 
Sunni Islamism. The al-Maliki regime was also able to enlist some US support, a classic balancing 
between Washington and Tehran that appeared to be crucial to regime survival. 
The Syrian uprising also strengthened the Kurds’ national and separatist ambitions. Syrian Kurd-
ish regions became effectively autonomous of Damascus, with trans-state links to the Kurdish 
Regional Government in northern Iraq. Moreover Iraq’s Kurds took advantage of the defeat of 
the Iraqi army by ISIS to seize Kirkuk and raise the spectre of independence, which, combined 
with possible demonstration effects among Kurds in Turkey and Iran, could be a first step toward 
carving a new Kurdistan out of the states system that a hundred years ago denied Kurdish national 
aspirations. If the unmaking of the Versailles imposed-Westphalian system is still unlikely, it is no 
longer unthinkable. 
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Conclusion
The troubled trajectories of the Levant states are ultimately rooted in the ‘original sin’ commit-
ted by the imperial powers at the end of WWI in what Fromkin (1989) called a ‘peace to end all 
peace’. By arbitrarily dividing up the region, they left behind a system of weak states suffering 
from incongruity between identity and boundaries and a pervasive irredentism. This was exposed 
by the immediate and repeated rise of both separatism (e.g. Kurds) and of movements and states 
bidding to re-unify the region, whether in ‘Greater Syria’, ‘Fertile Crescent’ or Pan-Arab schemes. 
Reaction against this order stimulated the era of Pan-Arab revolution in the 1950s and 60s in 
which weak oligarchic regimes were overthrown and more legitimate but initially highly unstable 
republics emerged. Politics in Iraq and Syria was trans-state, revolving around ideological issues of 
anti-imperialism, Arab unity and Ba’thist legitimacy. But a rising trajectory of state formation was 
underway and in the 1970-80s, war and oil led to consolidation of quite similar Ba’thist neo-patri-
monial leader-army-party states, incorporating, via rent and party organisation, widened constitu-
encies and which were more immune to trans-state penetration by the other. Paradoxically, under 
Pan-Arab Ba’thism, the normalisation of the states system appeared entrain as the centralisation of 
power over coercive and distributive apparatuses in Damascus and Baghdad, plus wars with Israel 
and Iran, strengthened state-centric identities. The new power of state identities could be seen in 
the ability of Syria and Iraq to wage war with huge conscript armies prepared to fight for the states 
against their enemies (most striking was the willingness of Shi’a Iraqi Arabs to fight for Iraq against 
Shi’a Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war). Syria-Iraq relations moved toward realist-like power balancing, 
exploiting mutual interdependencies and, as these Ba’thist siblings saw each other as increased 
threats, forging checkerboard alliances against the other. 
This peak in state building was reversed by the 1990s with the fall of oil prices, the end of the 
Cold War and the rise of US hegemony and neo-liberal penetration of the region. In response, Syria 
and Iraq sought opposite solutions to state vulnerabilities: war for Iraq and infitah/peace process 
for Syria. Both failed, and major watersheds in the destabilisation of the regional order were the 
two US wars that debilitated and then destroyed the Iraqi state, unleashing sectarianism at the 
expense of state identity and upsetting the regional balance of power. The post-Saddam shift of 
Iraq into Iran’s orbit alarmed Sunni powers who conducted a campaign to revive trans-state Sunni 
identity against what they called a ‘Shi’a Crescent’, stretching from Iran to Lebanon. The ‘Cres-
cent’, in turn, tried to construct a counter-narrative in which they constituted a ‘Resistance Front’, 
defending the region against Western and Israel-aligned regimes. For a period, backed by Pan-Arab 
satellite TV and Hezbollah’s demonstrated prowess against Israel, they held the ascendency. 
This ended when the Arab uprising spread to Syria, where the Iraqi scenario was replicated. The 
Assad regime’s use of anti-Sunni sectarianism and excessive violence against protestors, combined 
with the counter-fostering by Gulf states of Sunni movements fighting the regime, generated 
semi-sectarian civil war. With the collapse of order, many Syrians sought protection in contrary 
sub-state or trans-state identities, such as Syrian Alawi vs. Sunni Islamist. In Iraq, in parallel, the 
growing exclusion of Sunnis from the al-Maliki regime propelled them into the hands of radical 
Sunni Islamists. To be sure, a majority of citizens in both states, including Islamists, continued to 
identify with their states. But the fluidity of identity, the states’ loss of territorial control and their 
declining capacity to provide, not only material benefits, but even basic security, gave trans-state 
Islamic activists an unprecedented window of opportunity to promote an agenda explicitly aimed 
at the overthrow of the regional states system.
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Thus, both Syria and Iraq were again reduced to weak states penetrated by trans-state ideology, 
similar to the first three decades after independence. However, with much higher levels of mobil-
isation, militarisation, and sectarianisation, trans-state conflict was now more intense and violent 
than the low level subversion of the earlier period. Also symptomatic of the deeper collapse of 
states was the loss of territorial control by regimes to insurgent movements, resulting in a de-facto 
partition, or ‘Somalisation’, of both countries (Dukhan 2013). This opened the door for the pro-
foundly revisionist ISIS to challenge the very borders of the two states in the name of a trans-state 
jihad against regimes it considered to be ‘Shi’a’. If Iraq and Syria had previously been key actors 
in the promotion of an inclusive Pan-Arab identity, they now became the epicentre of a widening 
sectarian fragmentation of the whole regional system. 
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with Birzeit University, addressing climate vulnerable rural communities within the national 
territories of the watershed of the Jordan River (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the 
occupied Palestinian territory) which is perhaps the most physically and polically stressed 
river basin in the world, critically applying a human security approach. The aim of the 
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per	analyses	and	presents	findings	based	on	five	empirical	country	studies	conducted	in	
Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Yemen and the occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt). The research 
reflects	on	the	form	of	women’s	leadership	that	developed	during	and	after	the	Arab	Up-
risings	and	how	it	could	contribute	to	redefining	and	restrategising	women’s	activism	and	
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